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a b s t r a c t
The belief that one can exert intentional control over behavior is deeply rooted in virtually
all human beings. It has been shown that weakening such belief – e.g. by exposure to ‘anti-
free will’ messages – can lead people to display antisocial tendencies. We propose that this
cursory and irresponsible behavior may be facilitated by a breakdown of neurocognitive
mechanisms underlying behavioral adjustments. In the study reported here, we tested
the hypothesis that weakening belief in intentional control reduces cognitive markers of
behavioral control. Participants performed a Simon task before and after reading a scien-
tiﬁc text either denying free will (no-free will group) or not mentioning free will (control
group). Results showed that the post-error slowing, a cognitive marker of performance
adjustment, was reduced in the no-free will group. This reduction was proportional to a
decrease of the belief in intentional control. These observations indicate that weakening
the belief in free will can impact behavioral adjustment after an error, and could be the
cause of antisocial and irresponsible behavior.
 2013 Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
In many everyday-life situations we evaluate the im-
pact of our actions and adjust them according to external
constraints, such as environmental changes, or internal
states, such as desires and intentions. This capacity to exert
voluntary control over behavior is crucial for the adapta-
tion to the external environment and also for successful
interactions with other individuals (Baumeister, Crescioni,
& Alquist, 2011). Empirical data support the idea that the
belief that we can voluntarily control our behavior is a bio-
logical need and is adaptive for survival (for an overview
see Leotti, Iyengar, & Ochsner, 2010).
Belief in intentional control can be weakened after
exposing individuals to deterministic messages that deny
free will (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009; Rigoni,
Kühn, Gaudino, Sartori, & Brass, 2012; Rigoni, Kühn, Sar-
tori, & Brass, 2011; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Empirical
observations from social psychology also show that reduc-
ing belief in intentional control can have negative effects
on the way people behave, namely by reducing pro-social
and altruistic attitudes and by increasing antisocial and
aggressive behavior (Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs &
Schooler, 2008). It has been proposed that a loss of self-
control – i.e. the capacity to override one’s impulses (Bau-
meister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) – plays a cru-
cial role in leading to such behavioral changes (Baumeister
et al., 2009; Rigoni et al., 2012). More speciﬁcally, the
exposure to a deterministic message would weaken
people’s motivation to exert self-control. Since self-control
requires individuals to make an effort and spend energy, as
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indicated by increased blood glucose level (Gailliot & Bau-
meister, 2007; Gailliot et al., 2007), a lack of motivation
would lead people to go for more automatic and impulsive
courses of action (Baumeister et al., 2009).
Recently, a novel approach has been proposed to assess
which parts of the information processing chain are af-
fected by the belief manipulation (Rigoni et al., 2011,
2012). This research investigates how basic neurocognitive
processes underlying voluntary behavior are affected by
whether people believe they can exert intentional control.
It has been found that the Readiness Potential, a neuro-
physiological marker of intentional action preparation,
can be reduced when people are led to disbelieve in free
will (Rigoni et al., 2011). Disbelieving in free will also re-
duces voluntary motor inhibition and the feeling of having
deliberate control over a motor action (Rigoni et al., 2012).
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that it is possible to
reduce individuals’ belief in intentional control, and that
weakening belief in intentional control may lead to a deg-
radation of basic motor processes underlying voluntary
actions.
Here we present an experiment in which we tested
whether reducing belief in intentional control can affect a
speciﬁc aspect of intentional control, namely action moni-
toring. Action monitoring can be described as the ability to
evaluate the adequacy and success of a performance (see
Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, and Carter
(2004) for an overview). How people retrospectively eval-
uate their actions is crucial to determine future behavior,
as well as whether they feel responsible for the conse-
quences of their behavior. Irresponsible and impulsive
behavior following exposure to anti-free will messages
may result from a breakdown in the evaluation of the con-
sequences of behavior. Since dismissing intentional control
leads to cursory and irresponsible behavior (Baumeister
et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008) and to less intentional
involvement in the task (2012; Rigoni et al., 2011), we
wanted to test whether monitoring of action effects is re-
duced by exposure to anti-free will messages.
Experimentally, action monitoring is often investigated
by use of conﬂict tasks (e.g. Stroop task, Simon task, Erik-
sen-ﬂanker task). For instance, in the Simon task (see Si-
mon, 1990 for a review) participants respond with left-
or right-hand key press according to the color of a stimulus
presented either on the left or on the right of a ﬁxation
point. A conﬂict occurs when response and stimulus loca-
tion are incongruent, e.g. when a stimulus that requires a
right-hand response is presented on the left of the ﬁxation
point. In these tasks, action monitoring processes can be
assessed by studying ‘‘sequential effects’’, that is, how per-
formance on trial n is affected by the performance on trial
n  1. While large sequential effects reﬂect, at least partly,
an appropriate action monitoring (Kerns et al., 2004), ab-
sent or diminished sequential effects reveals a degraded
action monitoring. For instance, after an error subjects
are typically slower (Rabbitt, 1966). This post-error slow-
ing effect indicates a reaction to an error and is thought
to partially reﬂect involvement of control processes (Botvi-
nick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; but see Noteba-
ert et al., 2009). Thus, a large post-error slowing reﬂects an
appropriate action monitoring (Kerns et al. 2004), whereas
absent or diminished post-error slowing reveals a de-
graded action monitoring. Diminished post-error slowing
has been observed in patients with schizophrenia (Alain,
McNeely, He, Christensen, & West, 2002; Carter, MacDon-
ald, Ross, & Stenger, 2001; Kerns et al., 2005), children with
ADHD disorder (Jonkman, van Melis, Kemner, & Markus,
2007; Schachar et al., 2004; Sergeant & van der Meere,
1988; Wiersema, van der Meere, & Roeyers, 2005),
whereas one study reported an increased post-error slow-
ing in obsessive–compulsive patients (Fitzgerald et al.,
2005; but see Hajcak & Simons, 2002).
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that processes
underlying behavioral adjustment may be disrupted in
clinical conditions where intentional control is impaired.
Our main prediction is that exposing participants to an
anti-free will message that weakens the role of intentional
control will impair action monitoring processes. We expect
that the reduction of action monitoring mechanisms will
be associated with a decrease in the belief in intentional
control. To measure the belief in intentional control, we
employed the Free Will and Determinism-Plus scale
(FAD-Plus; Paulhus & Carey, 2011). The FAD-Plus includes
items concerning distinct aspects of beliefs about inten-
tional control, such as beliefs in free will (‘‘People have com-
plete control over decisions they make’’), scientiﬁc (‘‘As with
other animals, human behavior always follows the laws of
nature’’) as well as fatalistic determinism (‘‘Fate already
has a plan for everyone’’), and unpredictability of human
behavior (‘‘What happens to people is a matter of chance’’).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Forty-four university students (30 females, 14 males),
aged 18–32 years (M = 21.7 ± 2.8) volunteered for this
experiment, provided informed consent, and were paid
15 euros for participation. The study was conducted
according to the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved
by the local ethic committee of Aix-Marseille I University,
and by the ‘‘Comité de Protection des Personnes Sud Médi-
terranée 1’’ (number 10 41).
2.2. Experimental design and procedure
The experimental design was divided in a baseline and a
post-manipulation session. Further details on the experi-
mental procedure, the task, and ancillary self-report mea-
sures are reported in the supplementary material.
2.2.1. Baseline session
First, each participant completed at home the FAD-Plus
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011), that measures the belief in inten-
tional control. This scale is composed by 27 Likert-type
items (scores ranging from 1 = totally disagree, to 5 = to-
tally agree) and includes 4 subscales (Free Will, Scientiﬁc
Determinism, Fatalistic Determinism, and Randomness).
At least one week after, an experimental session was orga-
nized for each participant in the laboratory. Participants
ﬁrst completed the Positive and Negative Affective
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Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Then,
in a separate room, they performed a classical Simon task:
1 training block and 4 experimental blocks were recorded
(96 trials/block).
2.2.2. Belief manipulation
Participants were then randomly assigned to two differ-
ent groups. The no-free-will group read a text claiming
that scientists now recognize that free will is an illusion,
while control group read a passage from the same book –
i.e. the French version of The Astonishing Hypothesis, by
Francis Crick (1994) – that did not mention free will (Rig-
oni et al., 2011; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Participants were
encouraged to read the text carefully and that a compre-
hension test would have been administered at the end of
the experiment.
2.2.3. Post-manipulation session
After reading the text, each group performed 4 addi-
tional blocks of the Simon task. After the last block of the
Simon task, the PANAS, and the FAD-Plus were followed-
up. The duration of the entire session was about 1 h and
15 min.
3. Results
Concerning the Simon task, reaction times (RTs) faster
than 100 ms (anticipations) and later than 1 s (omissions)
were not considered in the analysis (i.e. less than 0.003%
of all trials). Data from 2 participants in the no-free will
group were rejected because of the very low accuracy in
the baseline Simon task – i.e. more than 2.5 standard devi-
ations (SDs) lower than whole sample average. Two control
participants were therefore randomly selected (the only
constraint was that the two group averages were eventu-
ally comparable regarding baseline task accuracy) and ex-
cluded from the analysis. This was done to assure that the
two groups did not differ with respect to task performance
in the baseline section, as well as with respect to the
sample size. After rejection, each group included 20 partic-
ipants. The two groups did not show signiﬁcant differences
regarding age (21.7 years-old ± 2.2 vs. 20.8 years-old ± 2.6,
for control and no-free will group, respectively) and educa-
tion level (14.5 years ± 1.3 vs. 14.3 years ± 0.8; all ps > .1).
3.1. Belief in intentional control
Scores on the Scientiﬁc Determinism (7 items) and on
the Fatalistic Determinism (5 items) subscales were in-
versed and aggregated to the score on the Free Will sub-
scale (7 items) in order to obtain a positive score of belief
in intentional control – i.e. Free Will score + (35 – Scientiﬁc
Determinism score) + (25 – Fatalistic Determinism score).
We tested whether the manipulation changed participants’
belief in intentional control by entering the aggregated
score as dependent variable into an ANOVA with session
(baseline, post-manipulation) as within subjects factor
and group (no-free will, controls) as between subjects fac-
tor. The analysis revealed a main effect of session
(F(1,38) = 4.65, p = .037, g2p ¼ :11), indicating a reduced be-
lief in intentional control after the manipulation (52.7 ± 8.6
vs. 50.62 ± 8.4). Although the session  group interaction
did not reach signiﬁcance (F(1,38) = 2.04, p = .16), speciﬁc
comparisons showed that the reduction of the belief in
intentional control was driven by the no-free will group
(53.15 ± 8.78 vs. 49.7 ± 7.33, t(19) = 2.61, p = .017), while
it was not signiﬁcant in the control group (52.25 ± 8.61
vs. 51.55 ± 9.45, t(19) = .5, p = .62). Since the two groups
did not differ in the baseline scores (t(38) = .33, p = .75)
this ﬁnding suggests that the manipulation reduced the be-
lief in intentional control mainly in the no-free will group.
3.2. Post-error slowing in the Simon task
In the baseline session, mean RTs and error rates did not
differ between the two groups, neither for the congruent
trials (379.04 ms ± 41.69 vs. 381.32 ms ± 42.67;
96.22% ± 3.2 vs. 95.83% ± 3.27, all ps > .1, for the no-free
will group and the control group, respectively) nor for
the incongruent trials (407.65 ms ± 43.4 vs.
406.44 ms ± 36.58; 91.83% ± 4.4 vs. 93.44% ± 6.87, all
ps > .1). RTs and error rates were then submitted to ANOVA
with session and previous trial (correct, error) as within
subjects factors, and group as between subjects factors.
For RTs, the analysis revealed a main effect of the previous
trial (F(1,38) = 34.83, p < .0001, g2p ¼ :48), with slower RTs
after errors than after correct trials (412.08 ms ± 54.07 vs.
381.85 ms ± 38.99, respectively). Importantly we found a
signiﬁcant session  previous trial  group interaction
(F(1,38) = 5, p < .05, g2p ¼ :12), with reduced post-error
slowing after the belief manipulation in the no-free will
group (36.99 ms ± 28.09 vs. 21.75 ms ± 29.92), but not in
the control group (27.42 ms ± 43.65 vs. 34.78 ms ± 40.39)
(Fig. 1). Paired comparisons indicated that post-error slow-
ing effect changed across session for the no-free will group
(t(19) = 3.45, p < .01) but not for the control group
(t(19) = .81, p > .1). We found neither main effects nor
interactions with error rates as dependent variable (all
ps > .1).
A correlation analysis was performed to test the
hypothesis that the reduction of the post-error slowing ef-
fect was related to the change of the belief in intentional
Fig. 1. Post-error slowing effect in the baseline and in the post-manip-
ulation session, for the no-free will group (⁄p < .05) and the control group.
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control in the no-free will group. A strong correlation was
found in the no-free will group (r = .73, n = 20, p < .0001),
but not in the control group (r = .33, n = 20, p = .15)
(Fig. 2). This ﬁnding indicates that the decrease of the
post-error slowing in the no-free will group was more pro-
nounced in participants showing diminished belief in
intentional control after the belief manipulation. Interest-
ingly, the slowing effect in the baseline session did not cor-
relate with the baseline belief in intentional control
(r = .056, n = 40, p = .73), indicating that the behavioral
effect is related to the change in the belief in intentional
control – i.e. as a consequence of the belief manipulation,
rather than to the a priori belief itself.
3.3. Ancillary measures
Wewanted to exclude that other processes unrelated to
the belief in intentional control were affected by the belief
manipulation. For instance, the behavioral effects might be
driven by a change in the emotional arousal triggered by
reading the text. The PANAS scores were submitted to AN-
OVA with session as a within subjects factor, and group as
between subjects factor. Overall, participants reported less
unpleasant emotions in the post-manipulation session, as
revealed by reduced PANAS negative subscale scores
(17.58 ± 6.55 vs. 14.98 ± 5.35, F(1,38) = 19.31, p < .0001,
g2p ¼ :34). However, the session  group interaction was
not signiﬁcant (F(1,38) = 1.83, p = .18). The analysis on
the PANAS positive subscale scores yielded neither main
effect of session (F(1,38) = .29, p = .59) nor session  group
interaction (F(1,38) = .61, p = .44).
4. Discussion
In the current study we showed that weakening belief
in intentional control impaired cognitive reaction to errors
in a conﬂict-task: the post-error slowing, a cognitive mar-
ker of performance adjustment following errors (Laming,
1968), was reduced in the no-free-will group after expo-
sure to a deterministic anti-free will message, as compared
to the control group (Fig. 1). Furthermore, in the no-free
will group the decrease of the post-error slowing was pro-
portional to the decrease of the belief in intentional control
(Fig. 2). This ﬁnding indicates that weakening the belief in
intentional control impacts performance monitoring, and
more speciﬁcally error monitoring processes.
The ﬁnding that the overall Simon effect (RTs and er-
rors) did not differ in the two groups after the belief
manipulation (see supplementary material) excludes the
possibility that the belief manipulation decreased the over-
all performance in the no-free will group. In addition, no
differences were found concerning other markers of per-
formance monitoring, such as the Gratton effect (Gratton,
Coles, & Donchin, 1992), suppression processes, as revealed
by the analysis of delta plots (Ridderinkhof, van den Wil-
denberg, Wijnen, and Burle, 2004), and automatic response
capture, as indicated by the conditional accuracy functions
(Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988). This
indicates that the belief manipulation speciﬁcally affected
cognitive reaction to errors. However we also observed
that, only in the no-free will group, increased intra-individ-
ual RT variability after the belief manipulation was associ-
ated with a decrease of the belief in intentional control (see
supplementary material). This observation suggests that
other processes reﬂecting performance control may have
been affected by the belief manipulation (see Fiske & Rice,
1955 for an overview on performance variability).
Previous studies in social psychology have revealed that
weakening the belief that people can intentionally control
their own actions strongly impacts behavior (e.g., 1989; Aj-
zen 2002; Bandura, 1982). Namely, the stronger people’s
belief in their capabilities, the stronger andmore persistent
are the effort they put into behavior (Bandura, 1989). Re-
cently it has been also shown that a disbelief in free will
leads to antisocial tendencies, such as aggressive behavior
(Baumeister et al., 2009) and cheating (Vohs & Schooler,
2008). We have argued that these effects on behavior are
mediated by a degradation of basic neurocognitive pro-
cesses underlying voluntary action, such as action prepara-
tion (Rigoni et al., 2011), intentional inhibition and
perceived self-control (Rigoni et al., 2012). The current
study extends these ﬁndings by showing that weakening
belief in intentional control also impairs cognitive reaction
to errors.
How does weakening the belief in intentional control
leads to such behavioral and neurocognitive changes?
Our results indicate that behavioral effects result from
diminished belief in intentional control – i.e. as a conse-
quence to the exposure to messages that challenge free
will, – rather than the initial belief itself. In addition, the
analysis on the PANAS scores suggests that the effects are
not driven by the affective valence of the text. This is in line
with previous data (Vohs & Schooler, 2008) that showed
that mood is not crucially involved in the behavioral
changes after the anti-free will manipulation. One tenta-
tive interpretation is that exposure to explicit information
challenging the role of free will in goal-directed behavior,
would reduce the effort for implementing cognitive control
(Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, and Nieuwenhuis, 2004).
In other words, participants exposed to an anti-free will
Fig. 2. The scatter plot displays the correlation between the change in the
belief in intentional control score and the change in the post-error
slowing effect, for both groups. The black solid line and the grey dashed
line represent the regression lines for the no-free will group and the
control group, respectively.
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message would spend less effort to adjust their perfor-
mance according to contextual needs. Under this perspec-
tive, a decrease of post-error slowing in the no-free will
group may reﬂect a reduced recruitment of cognitive con-
trol processes involved in action monitoring. An account
involving diminished intentional effort for exerting cogni-
tive control would be in line with prior observations of re-
duced intentional inhibition and perceived control (Rigoni
et al., 2012), and reduced neurophysiological correlates of
intentional action preparation (Rigoni et al., 2011), after
exposure to information denying free will. Also, it may ex-
plain why weakening belief in free will leads to antisocial
tendencies. A lack of cognitive control would likely result
in more carless and impulsive behavior, and this in turn
may lead people to display antisocial tendencies (Baumei-
ster et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008).
In sum, our results indicate that weakening belief in
intentional control can affect the way people react to er-
rors in order to adjust their performance. This observation
suggests that challenging the role of intentional control
may lead people to be less concerned about the negative
consequences of their actions. We propose that disproving
intentional control by exposing participants to a message
that denies free will results in reduced effort to implement
cognitive control. A decreased intentional effort to exert
cognitive control may be the candidate basic process
accounting for the observation that reducing belief in free
will leads to antisocial behavior.
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